What Do Economic Models
Tell Us About the Effects of the U.S,~CanadaFree Trade Agreement?
i~!ITUDIESOF THE historic U.S-Canada Free Trade Agreement have produced conflicting estimates of its economic effects.1 Not surprisingly, the numerous changes resulting from the Free Trade Agreement will benefit some people and harm others. To summarize the agreement's effects, many studies have estimated the minimum amount that individuals who gain would be willing to accept to forego the changes and the maximum that those who lose would be willing to pay to prevent them.
2 Subtracting the value of the losses from the gains produces a measure of net national welfare change. Using such a measure, estimates for Canada, expressed as a percentage of total economic activity, range from large gains to small losses, while estimates for the United States range from small gains to small losses.
This paper closely examines five recent studies to better understand their estimates as well as identify why they contradict each other. While the five studies focus on the U.S-Canada Free Trade Agreement, they represent the typical modeling approaches used to quantify the impact of changes in trade laws. Thus, the following discussion helps explain why these analyses often reach widely different conclusions about the same trade policy change. In addition, the discussion points out some limitations of these kinds of analyses.
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To assess the results and limitations of the different studies, the key aspects of the U.S-Canada Free Trade Agreement first must be identified. The agreement, summarized in table 1, estab-1 See Coughlin et al. (1988) for an introduction to the theoretical arguments underlying protectionist trade policies and the empirical evidence indicating that the costs borne by consumers of such policies generally far exceed the benefits captured by domestic producers and government.
2lhis measure of welfare change is called an equivalent income variation. For a brief discussion of this measure, see Henderson and Quandt (1980) . (The Brookings Institution, 1987) .
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Most trade restrictions on energy resources are prohibited. The exceptions are limited to cases of shortages, conservation or national security; however, even in the case of shortages, the reduced supplies must be shared between both countries.
Trade barriers on alcoholic beverages have been only partially eliminated. Although the agreement eliminates some barriers limiting the trade of wines and distilled spirits, Canadian barriers limiting the importation of U.S. beer will remain unchanged. 7
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The agreement provides national treatment for all aspects of the establishment and operation of businesses. This means that U.S-owned firms in Canada and Canadian-owned firms in the United States will be treated as domestic firms. The agreement addresses U.S. concerns about Canadian policies designed to influence foreign investment. Specifically, Canada agreed to stop imposing performance requirements, such as requiring an investor to export a certain amount of goods, and) beginning in 1992, to stop screening U.S. direct acquisitions of Canadian assets of less than C$150 million (in constant 1992 Canadian dollars).
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The concept of national treatment has been extended to financial services, making this the first time that the United States has reached a bilateral agreement covering all financial services. Virtually all discriminatory Canadian practices are eliminated. For example, the Canadian assets of foreign bank subsidiaries operating in Canada previously were limited to no more than 16 percent of all domestic assets of the Canadian banking system. Under the agreement, U.S. bank subsidiaries are no longer subject to this limitation on their market share.
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The agreement is also noteworthy because it is the first international agreement dealing with trade and investment barriers in the service industries. Many service industries such as transportation, basic telecommunications, health, education and social services, however, are not covered. Nonetheless, the principle of national treatment has been extended to most commercial services such as construction, tourism, computer services, wholesale and retail trade, management services and other business services. Since many of these require the movement of personnel for limited periods, the agreement changes immigration regulations to facilitate business-related travel.
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The Canada-United States Trade Commission has been established to implement the agreement. This group will resolve disputes on all matters except financial services and those involving charges of either foreign government export subsidies, called countervailing duty cases, or sales of a good abroad at a price lower than is charged in the domestic market, called anti-dumping cases. Disputes involving financial services will be handled by a formal consultative mechanism between the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Canadian Department of Finance. Countervailing duty and anti-dumping cases are subject to review, upon request, by a special binational panel!' This panel, whose decision is final, reviews the case in light of the domestic laws of the importing country. Thus, each country retains the right to enforce its own laws. estimate their likely consequences face numerous issues involving economic theory, modeling approaches and measurement. While economic theory provides much assistance in modeling the effects of the agreement, it provides no definitive conclusion about the welfare consequences for a specific country. One aspect of the modeling process in which economic theory plays an important role is in the selection of the modeling approach. No matter which approach is chosen, the far-reaching nature of the agreement prevents some aspects from being incorporated into quantitative models -The wide range of trade barriers affected by the agreement poses further problems. To understand fully the usefulness of the studies discussed later, these underlying issues are examined below.
International trade theory generally concludes that free trade leads to the most efficient utilization of the world's resources and, consequently, maximizes the value of world output. Every move toward freer trade, such as the elimination of trade barriers among a group of countries, however, does not necessarily increase national welfare!' The reason for this apparent contradiction is that the formation of a free trade area, while eliminating one trade distortion, creates another. The tariff reduction resulting from a free trade agreement will eliminate the distortion between domestic goods and imports from the partner country, a change that increases national welfare. A new distortion, however, is created between imports from the partner country and those from non-partner countries that reduces welfare.
These opposing welfare effects, illustrated in the shaded insert on pages 47-50, can be described very simply. If the formation of a free trade area results in the domestic production of some goods and services in one member country being replaced by imports of these goods and services from other member countries, then the greater specialization in production based on comparative advantage will enhance the economic welfare of the member countries. The term for this welfare-increasing reallocation of production is "trade creation." "Trade diversion," however, occurs when lower-cost imports from outside the free trade area are replaced by imports produced at higher cost from a member country. This can occur because goods imported from a member are not subject to tariffs or other restrictions, while goods potentially imported from non-member countries continue to face the same barriers as before. This trade diversion shifts production away from the pattern consistent with comparative advantage.b0
The relative magnitudes of trade creation and trade diversion determine whether the welfare of members rises or falls. Thus, it is natural to use quantitative models to assist in assessing whether the agreement is likely to be beneficial or harmful to the two countries.
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The standard way to model the effects of international trade policy changes is to construct and solve a theoretical model using assumed values of critical parameters to derive the solution. General equilibrium models usually are chosen to capture the numerous market interactions that take place both within and among countries. Thus, the standard model used for this purpose is called an "applied general equilibrium model." Equilibrium in this type of model is characterized by a set of prices such that the market demand for each output and input equals the market supply. The market supply for each output reflects the production decisions of firms motivated by profit maximization. Input demand 'Viner (1950) 5ee Shoven and Whalley (1984) for an introduction to applied generam equilibrium models. This introduction hightights how these models work using a numerical example. In addition, they provide a review of research using these models to examine international trade issues.
functions are derived from production functions that use only capital and labor. The market demand for each product in this model reflects utility-maximizing consumption decisions of individuals. Demand functions are derived from maximizing utility functions subject to a budget constraint. The budget constraint contains a measure of income generated through the supply of inputs that are used in the production process.
Values for parameters in the production and utility functions must be specified to solve such a model. For example, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the production function, as well as that between goods in the utility function, must be specified. ' 2 The solution to the model, characterized by the market prices of the inputs and outputs and the corresponding quantities, ensures that market demand equals market supply for all inputs and outputs and that profits are zero in each industry. There are major differences, however, among models that fall into this category. The estimates discussed below rely on one of two fundamental theoretical approaches.
The traditional approach focuses on the gains from comparative advantage. A key assumption in the comparative advantage approach is that markets are competitive. Using the HeckscherOhlin approach to international trade, production costs vary across countries prior to international trade because of differences in the endowments of productive resources. Countries relatively well-endowed with certain resources are able to produce those goods whose production requires relatively large amounts of these resources at lower cost than other countries. \%Tith free trade, countries gain by exchanging export goods that they produce at relatively lower cost for imports produced at relatively lower cost from other countries. In essence, trade allows each country to export its abundant productive resources in exchange for the relatively abundant productive resources of its trading partners. The existence of trade barriers prevents some of the gains from producing, trading and consuming on the basis of comparative advantage from being realized.
The alternative approach used in estimating the effects of the reduction of trade barriers applies standard models used in industrial organization to international trade. In this approach, most output markets are assumed to be imperfectly competitive rather than perfectly competitive. Frequently, the imperfectly competitive markets result from the existence of economies of scale in production. These economies of scale cause declining average production costs as the level of output expands. In this case, the increase in the size of the market for individual producers allows for gains from trade.'• fl~afttres 4:jĨ rrespective of the modeling approach chosen, several features of the agreement are not quantified. ' 4 Many of these features are potentially important and, thus, could significantly alter the agreement's net impact.
One of the agreement's goals is the creation of a more stable business environment for all forms of international business activity. Many Canadians believe secure access to the U.S. market is essential for Canadian economic prosperity, and that such access is being threatened by the U.S.' increasing use of trade laws for protectionist reasons." As an example justifying this concern, Copeland (1989) notes that the United States recently placed a 35 percent import duty on Canadian shakes and shingles to protect U.S. producers.
12 The elasticity of input substitution is a measure of the responsiveness of the optimal laborlcapital combination to a change in the relative prices of these inputs. The elasticity of substitution between goods is defined analogously. "The welfare consequences of economies of scale can be negative. In models of trade between a large and a small country, Markusen and Melvin (1981) and Ethier (1982) show that the output of goods with increasing returns to scale in the small country might decrease rather than increase with a change from autarchy, a situation in which the country engages in no international trade, to free trade. The increase in average production costs in the small country may more than offset the benefits of specialization due to comparative advantage.
" Shea (1988) highlights similar aspects of the agreement that are not quantified. "See Lea (1987) and Trezise (1987) for assessments of the Canadian perspective on this issue. The use of trade laws for protectionist reasons is termed "contingent protection." Contingent protection encompasses a range of import restrictions, such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties, escape clause petitions and legislation dealing with "unfair" international trade. Ethier (1988) , p. 234, has argued that the "use of the anti-dumping law has greatly increased and the statute is likely to become a principal protectionist tool," while a recent article in The Economist (October 22, 1988) , p. 16, referred to the "capricious interpretation and enforcement" of U.S. anti-dumping laws as a potentially important trade barrier. and consuming this good. br-apI ticallv. this is firs good are given b~the ar-ea under-the desin rily area A / B ma rid ('U rye front () to (i,. or' area ()Z13Q 0
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A second feature of the agreement that cannot be quantified easily involves the consequences of the liberalized trade in services. Since models typically view the service sector as producing a non-traded service, they do not analyze explicitly the trade in services. Even if models allowed for trade in services, however, translating policies that discriminate against trade in services into tariff measures would be extremely difficult. Finally, it is hoped, especially in the United States, that the U5.-Canada agreement of national treatment for service providers will encourage the current GATT negotiations to reach a similar agreement in a multilateral context-Though such an agreement would have far-reaching consequences, these consequences cannot be estimated in the context of the U5-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
Because most economic models incorporate the service sector, and all other sectors as well, at aggregation levels that lump many industries together, another problem is created. The costs and benefits of the agreement tend to be understated to an unknown degree; therefore, short of disaggregating the model, there is no way to tell precisely how much the costs or the benefits have been understated.
For example, using a two-digit Standard Industrial Classification scheme, transportation equipment is treated as one industry. The agreement, however, could cause one sector of transportation equipment to contract and another sector to expand. The movement of workers from the contracting to the expanding sector, which entails temporary unemployment and other costs for the affected workers, is not captured by a model that treats transportation equipment as a single industry.
On the other hand, this aggregation also underestimates the benefits of the agreement. I N -l'itis ciemna ml shift imidtrces a pm'om inic'tioni reprd'serm ts tIre ma r'kc't demand l,tc-ed by I -esponse as Ca na ci ian pn-oductiom m inc ta se'i Cansa ciian prod triers before iite agn'c'emen I I ronn QI tO ft -tni ac Id it icimi, p 'icc' decline 5 and] 13' -'-t3' cc presc ntIs the market dema mici from I'm to~m -after' the agi-eennseritFc.mllowing lull and Wha 11ev (1983), (.anadiamt I-vens t hotmghs Canadian prod uc'en-s will riot p icudu rc'rs a nc' a ssu med to pride their good at generate inc ceased proFits -tI serc' a mc' rue its average cost to high]igi it gr'a phic'aIfv the benrefits fcw Camsada -Canadian consurnten's ts-effare c-on soquen ices st c'rnnning from tariff bente lit front i rtc'm'ea sed consunupticm stemitred uc tions in the case of econoniues cf scale.'-timing from the price tc-osti savings a ssocia ted With average cost pm'icing. I hc' pm'ice amid unitwith economies of scale. i'his increase in conput fc'vc'f s before the agm-eeniem it a n-c' deter'-so risers smrr p Ins is repm'c'sen ii dcl In' the a rca nsined by the irstem'sec lion di F the average cost PP \ V.
bTheory suggests, however. that f there realty are input level for which marginal revenue equals Marginal creasing returns to scale at aim levels of production. ihe cost and sets his price accordingly result would be a monopolist who produces at an outHighly aggregated models, by averaging tariff rates across sectors within an industry, underrepresent the distortions caused by tariffs. In other words, tariffs appear to distort relative import prices by less than they actually do.'Ẽ liminating these distortions is one source of the gains from the agreement because production and consumption decisions no longer will be artificially distorted. Since the elimination of larger distortions generates larger benefits, highly aggregated models understate the benefits associated with tariff reductions.
The models are also not well-suited to identify the gains resulting from other possible effects of the agreement. Positive effects can result from the increased competition stemming from reductions in trade barriers. When firms are insulated from competition, they may not minimize their production costs.
18 When owners are separated from managers, the absence of competitive pressures may allow managers to incur costs to achieve their own interests at the expense of reduced profits. The increase in competitive pressures from increased international trade increases the probability that production costs will be minimized.
In addition, these firms might be pressured into additional research and development expenditures that generate either new products or cost-saving production processes. The enlargement of the market might also attract new investment from non-partner countries. These possibilities, which are potentially significant, tend to be ignored by quantitative trade models.
Finally, all models share one other quantification problem: how to incorporate the elimination of non-tariff barriers into the analysis. This poses a problem because non-tariff barriers must first be identified and, then, converted into their tariff~equivalents.b9 Even if a non-tariff barrier can be identified, it is often difficult to calculate its tariff-equivalent accurately. For example, government procurement policies, a wellknown non-tariff barrier, are not easily converted into an equivalent tariffs. As a result, estimates of the effects of eliminating trade barriers typically omit some non-tariff barriers. In addition, estimates based on non-tariff barriers must be viewed cautiously. Indeed, some researchers ignore non-tariff barriers entirely and simply report the consequences of eliminating tariffs alone.
Models based on either the perfect competition/comparative advantage or the imperfect competition approaches have been estimated to identify the welfare consequences of ehminating trade barriers in the agreement. To make the discussion of the agreement's overall effect on the United States and Canada manageable, the results of five recent studies are examined: Hamilton and Whalley (1985) , Brown and Stern (1987 and 1989) , Cox and Harris (1986) and Wigle (1988) . As table 3 shows, these studies exemplify the different approaches and yield conflicting results. The studies by Hamilton and Whalley, and Brown and Stern (1987) are based on comparative advantage, while those by Cox and Harris, Wigle, Brown and Stern (1989) are based on imperfect competition.
The results conflict in terms of the gainers and losers as well as the magnitudes of these gains and losses. Depending on which study is used, the results show both the United States and Canada gaining, the United States losing and Canada gaining or the United States gaining and Canada losing. Relative to each country's gross domestic product, the welfare consequences for the United States range from -003 17A simple example can illustrate this argument. Assume two import-competing industries, each protected by an average 5 percent tariff rate; thus, the relative price distortions caused by the tariffs in each industry appear similar.
For one industry, however, the average 5 percent tariff rate resutts from a 5 percent tariff rate for each sector. For the other industry, the average results from averaging a 10 percent rate and a zero percent rate. The latter industry has more distortions that the former because the differential tariff rates distort the relative prices across sectors.
The effect of aggregation is to treat every sector within an industry as if it had the same level of protection from import competition. Consequently, the gains from eliminating the distortions within an industry are ignored. The higher the level of aggregation, the more these distortions within industries are ignored.
'~Thispossibility, termed X-efficiency, has been stressed in a more general context by Leibenstein (1980) .
The tariff-equivalent of a specific non-tariff barrier is the tariff rate that would generate the same effect on the price of the imported good as the non-tariff barrier. To illustrate, assume first that world prices of sortie imported good are fixed. Like a tariff, a non-tariff barrier causes the price of the imported good to rise. A non-tariff barrier, such as a quota, causes this price increase by reducing the supply of imports. The percentage increase in the price of the imported good is the tariff-equivalent. For many non-tariff barriers, it is difficult to quantify the supply-reducing consequences of the barriers. The conflicting and substantially divergent results from these studies are due to a variety of reasons. One key reason is that the values chosen for the elasticities of substitution between capital and labor and between different consumer goods vary across these studies. Table  4 lists several other characteristics that could explain the conflicting findings. These include the numbers of countries and goods, production functions, market structure, how prices are set and the mobility of resources. Some insights into the importance of these differences are provided below Hamilton and Whalley's (1985) model departs from the textbook comparative-advantage model using the Heckscher-Ohlin approach in two ways. First, demand and production function parameters differ across countries and, second, products are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous across countries."
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Ihul not tin Canada a'~a vi huRl iiill I liSt' 11(1111 Canada aIIm-i" for-irrrrezrs'd ( anadian sales in the U.S. market. The resulting increase in U.S. demand for some Canadian-produced goods will increase the price of these goods in Canada and the world market; this is another change that benefits Canada. Thus, there are beneficial and adverse terms-of-trade effects occurring simultaneously.
The net welfare consequences for Canada and the United States depend on the relative importance of these effects. From the Canadian perspective, the adverse terms-of-trade effects are larger if Canada's tariffs on U.S. exports are higher on average than U.S. tariffs on Canadian exports. This is, in fact, what is shown in table 2. Canadian terms of trade will also decline the more (less) similar U.S. and Canadian goods are to Canadian (U.S.) consumers.
Although Canada's tariffs on U.S. exports before the agreement were higher on average than U.S. tariffs on Canadian exports, Hamilton and Whalley still find that the gains from the agreement primarily accrue to Canada (see table  3 ). They attribute this finding to the fact that Canada is the smaller partner. The smaller partner's production and consumption behavior are less likely to affect world prices, enabling it to take greater advantage of the trade diversion effects in the larger region.
Yet, using a model with features similar to that used by Hamilton and Whalley, Brown and Stern (1987) found that the United States gained, but Canada lost. As shown in table 3, the bilateral removal of trade barriers by Canada and the United States leads to an increase in U.S. welfare, 0.04 percent of gross domestic product, but a decrease in Canadian welfare, 0.35 percent of gross domestic product. Brown and Stern argue that the reduction in Canadian welfare stems from the relatively higher Canadian tariff rate prior to the agreement. The removal of this protection, which causes Canadian consumers to substitute imported goods from the United States for Canadian-produced goods, leads to a reduction in the relative price of Canadian goods.
Why do these two studies differ so much with respect to the outcome for Canada? Brown and Stern found their results were sensitive to the assumptions about the elasticity of substitution among imports from various sources. In other words, the results were sensitive to the degree of substitutability between U.S. imports from Canada and the rest of the world and between Canadian imports from the United States and the rest of the world.
The greater the degree of substitutability, the larger the U.S. gain and the smaller the Canadian loss. If imports from various sources are close substitutes, the preferential tariff reduction induces a substitution from third-country suppliers to the partner. Relatively speaking, little substitution out of the domestically produced good occurs. As the demand for output from the third-party countries declines, the terms of trade for both Canada and the United States improves. Even for very high assumed values for the elasticity of substitution among imports, however, Brown and Stern found a decline in Canadian welfare.
Brown and Stern also examined whether the decline in Canadian welfare was associated with a movement of capital from Canada to the United States; this possibility could not occur in Hamilton and Whalley's model. While Brown and Stern did find a capital movement from Canada to the United States, the Canadian welfare loss is nearly invariant to different assumptions about the sensitivity of capital flows to U.S. and Canadian rate-of-return differencesModels based on comparative advantage assume that all markets are perfectly competitive. This assumption is inaccurate for many markets in Canada. To address this issue and others, Cox and Harris (1985) developed a general equilibrium model of the Canadian economy that incorporates both economies of scale and imperfect competition.22 In a later paper, Cox and Harris (1986) present estimates of economic effects of the Free Trade Agreement. Wonnacott (1987) notes that the difference between many U.S. and Canadian manufacturing 22 The model is not a complete general equilibrium model.
The two sectors foreign" to Canada, the United States and all other countries in the rest of the world, are summarized by exogenous import prices and a set of export demand functions.
operations has been a research topic for Canadian economists since the mid-1960s. Canadian manufacturers, especially those producing consumer durables, have tended to produce a wide range of products, each in relatively small quantity. The standard explanation is that diversified, small-scale production is caused by the trade barriers of both countries.
Canadian trade barriers, by protecting domestic producers from foreign competition, enable Canadian firms to produce a variety of products profitably, even though these products are expensive by international standards. Meanwhile, U.S. trade barriers restrict Canadian access to the U.S. market and, in turn, provide an incentive for Canadian producers to focus on the Canadian market.23 Thus, the reduction of tariff barriers in the agreement should lead to expanded production with lower per-unit costs. The gains stemming from these changes are called rationalization gains.
Cox and Harris' modeling innovation was to incorporate economies of scale into the analysis. Production in each manufacturing industry is assumed to be characterized by increasing returns to scale, which results in lower per unit average production costs as output increases. Production in each non-manufacturing industry is assumed to be characterized by constant returns to scale.
Since non-competitive firms are price-searchers and, hence, set their prices to maximize their profits, assumptions about price-setting are required. Two price-setting hypotheses are used. One is a monopolistic competitive pricing hypothesis in which profit-maximizing firms set the price of their products as a given mark-up over their marginal cost of production. The size of the mark-up depends on the price elasticity of demand. The second hypothesis relies on a collusive model in which all firms set their prices equal to the world price plus the tariff. 2C
ox and Harris combine these hypotheses by assuming that the actual prices are a weighted average of the monopolistically competitive and collusive prices. The set of these weighted prices that clears both goods and factor markets is the equilibrium set of prices for Canadian firms.
Irrespective of the pricing assumption, tariff reductions increase import competition and, thus, the prices of imported goods for Canadian consumers tend to decline. For monopolistically competitive firms, the increased competition raises the elasticity of demand and, thereby, reduces the mark-up over marginal cost. Similarly, the collusive price declines because it is set equal to the world price plus the shrinking tariff. The resulting stimulation of Canadian consumption is accompanied by an increase in output by Canadian firms to satisfy the zeroprofit condition.25
Five sets of parameters, whose specific values are based primarily on previous estimates in other studies, are especially important in determining the equilibria.2G A set of export price elasticities for Canadian firms is one set of parameters. The removal of U.S. tariffs on imports from Canada eliminates the difference between prices paid by U.S. consumers and prices received by Canadian exporters. The removal of U.S. tariffs tends not only to lower the prices for U.S. consumers of imported goods from Canada, but also to increase the prices received by Canadian exporters. The extent of Canadian penetration of the U.S. market depends on the responsiveness of Canadian exports to these price increases. Conversely, a set of Canadian import price elasticities is needed to assess the consequences of the reduction of Canadian tariffsAs suggested above, an assumption about the weighting parameter is necessary to determine whether prices tend to be set more according to monopolistic or collusive behavior. The pricesetting behavior influences the degree of the reallocation of productive resources that the agreement causes.
Estimates for the elasticity of the average cost curves for the Canadian manufacturing industries are used. These parameters play a key role in determining numerous results such as the potential gains from the reallocation of productive resources and the degree of increased sales in U.S. markets.
An additional incentive noted by Wonnacott (1987) for diversified, small scale production is caused by Canadian exposure to U.S. advertising that reinforces Canadian demand for a wide range of products.
24A fundamental problem with this assumption is that, because firms do not make profits in this model, there is no incentive to collude, 25This general description is only suggestive of the general tendency for firm output to expand. With Canadian resources fixed and numerous relative price changes, the output of each and every firm will not have risen when the new equilibrium is attained. ZtAdditional details on the calibration of the model can be found in Cox and Harris (1985) .
A fifth set of parameters is the trade policy parameters. Foreign and Canadian tariffs, as well as tariff equivalents of some non-tariff barriers, are used. Cox and Harris (1986) estimate that the elimination of all barriers to bilateral trade results in Canadian welfare gains of 8.74 percent relative to its gross domestic product (see table 3). They argue that this large gain is due to the preferential access to the U.S. market that Canadian producers will receive. As a small country, Canada benefits because the source of U.S. imports is diverted from other countries to Canada.
27 The Canadian benefits of this diversion are magnified because of the assumed economies of scale in Canadian manufacturing.
Another study of the agreement that incorporated scale economies was done by Wigle (1988) . Despite incorporating similar features to those used by Cox and Harris, Wigle did not find large Canadian gains. As shown in table 3, Wigle estimates that the bilateral abolition of tariffs produces a slight reduction in Canadian welfare, 0.05 percent relative to its gross domestic product. Meanwhile, U.S. welfare increased by 0.06 percent relative to its gross domestic product. The sharp contrast between his results and those of Cox and Harris caused Wigle to explore the specific features of the two models that were responsible for the very different conclusions.
Cox and Harris combined the two assumptions about price-setting behavior-monopolistic competitive pricing and collusive pricing-by assuming that prices are set as a weighted average of the prices set by these methods. Wigle, on the other hand, assumed that all firms in the nonmechanical manufacturing sector used monopolistic competitive pricing, while firms in the equipment and vehicles sector used collusive pricing. According to Wigle, the differences in the pricing assumptions are negligible, and changes in them did not eliminate the difference in his and Cox and Harris' results. Brown and Stern ruled out economies of scale in their model because they doubted its significance for Canada. Canadian firms, because of already low U.S. tariffs, had access to the U.S. market. Thus, they argue, gains from the interindustry reallocation of resources are likely to be more important than intra-industry changes.
The Cox and Harris and Wigle models also incorporated collusive pricing. Given this assumption, trade liberalization causes increased output per firm. Brown and Stern suggest, however, that a collusive market structure is not likely to persist in the face of free entry. They also point out that market structures in Canada, as well as the United States, show much more variety than has been assumed in previous models. As a re27With bilateral free trade, the proportion of total Canadian trade accounted for by the United States rises from 71 percent to 76 percent. Like the previously discussed Brown and Stern (1987) study, the model uses four countries and 29 industries, 22 tradeable and seven non-tradeable. Each industry is characterized by one of five market structures: perfect competition; monopolistic competition with free entry; monopolistic competition without entry; market segmentation with free entry; and market segmentation without entry.
Both perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive industries are characterized by product differentiation. Product differentiation by country applies to perfectly competitive industries, while products are differentiated by firms in monopolistically competitive industries. Perfectly competitive firms determine their profit-maximizing output levels by setting price equal to marginal cost, while monopolistically competitive firms maximize profits by setting price as a mark-up over marginal cost.
Homogeneous (that is, identical) products are assumed for the remaining imperfectly competitive industries that are characterized by market segmentation. With segmented markets and each firm producing the same product within an industry, all firms selling to consumers in a specific country must charge the same price, though this price may vary across countries. Each firm, assuming that output by other firms is fixed, establishes a profit-maximizing price for each national market.
Equilibrium in each industry is characterized by zero profits. With free entry, the number of firms in equilibrium assures that price equals average total cost. For market structures without entry, the number of firms remains constant. Equilibrium prices are determined in world markets. Tariffs and exchange rates connect the equilibrium prices to the prices paid by consumers and received by sellers in the individual regions.
As shown in table 3, the welfare consequences of the bilateral elimination of tariffs are small. Canadian welfare rises by $2 billion, which is 1 percent of its gross domestic product in 1976. U.S. welfare rises as well, but only by $1.6 billion, 0.09 percent of U.S. gross domestic product in 1976.
Quantitative models produce conflicting results about the economic effects of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Results for the United States range from small negative to small positive effects on welfare, while results for Canada range from small negative to large positive effects. The conflicting results emerge both from different assumptions about market structures and the values of certain parameters associated with supply and demand and from differences in the level of detail as to commodities and countries. Since there is no consensus about the "best" assumptions, and because international trade theory provides no definitive conclusion about a nation's welfare following the formation of a free trade area, it is important that users of these models understand the reasons for their conflicting results.
Since the assumption of perfectiy competitive markets throughout all sectors of all countries is unlikely to hold, the incorporation of imperfectly competitive markets is a promising development. Models that incorporate such markets raise a number of problems, however, because of the various pricing assumptions that have been used and the need for characterizing the extent of the economies of scale. These newer models are also more sensitive to the values chosen for the parameters than those based on perfect competition.
Perhaps just as important, several key aspects of the agreement are not included in these models because they are extremely difficult to quantify. These unmeasured aspects may be more important than the measured ones in terms of the final outcomes. Changes in the rules and procedures governing international trade and investment can yield large benefits that are not included in these models. For example, many Canadians believe that secure access to the U.S. market is essential for Canadian economic prosperity. Consequently, the Canadian assessment of the desirability of the agreement might hinge on whether or not the agreement provides this security. Analogously, the precedent-setting aspects of the agreement concerning services are likely to influence the U.S. assessment of the benefits of this agreement.
Thus, quantitative estimates derived from models are simply some of the many pieces of information that are useful in the decision process and, in some cases, may not represent the most important pieces.
Quantitative trade models have improved substantially in recent years. Nevertheless, as this review points out, let the user beware.
